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An Accretive Operator Approach to Ergodic Problems for Zero-Sum
Games
Antoine Hochart∗†
Abstract— Mean payoff stochastic games can be studied by
means of a nonlinear spectral problem involving the Shapley
operator: the ergodic equation. A solution consists in a scalar,
called the ergodic constant, and a vector, called bias. The
existence of such a pair entails that the mean payoff per time
unit is equal to the ergodic constant for any initial state, and the
bias gives stationary strategies. By exploiting two fundamental
properties of Shapley operators, monotonicity and additive
homogeneity, we give a necessary and sufficient condition for the
solvability of the ergodic equation for all the Shapley operators
obtained by perturbation of the transition payments of a given
stochastic game with finite state space. If the latter condition is
satisfied, we establish that the bias is unique (up to an additive
constant) for a generic perturbation of the transition payments.
To show these results, we use the theory of accretive operators,
and prove in particular some surjectivity condition.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we are interested in stochastic games with
mean payoff. A first question is to understand under which
conditions the value of such games is independent of the
initial state. This question can be studied by means of the
ergodic equation. When the state space is finite, the latter
writes
T (u) = λe + u , (1)
where T : Rn → Rn is the Shapley operator, e is the unit
vector of Rn, and (λ, u) ∈ R×Rn is a solution. If such a pair
exists, the scalar λ, called ergodic constant, gives the mean
payoff per time unit for every initial state, and the vector u,
called bias, determines optimal stationary strategies. Here,
we study the situation in which the ergodic equation has
a solution for all the Shapley operators obtained by per-
turbation of the transition payments of a given stochastic
game. When this property is satisfied, we say that the game
is ergodic. Several results in control theory [1], [2], discrete
event systems theory [3], [4] or Perron-Frobenius theory [5],
[6] leads to sufficient ergodicity conditions for games, which
are related to accessibility conditions. Under particular hy-
pothesis (bounded transition payment function [7], “weakly
convex” Shapley operator [8], etc.), these conditions are also
necessary.
A second question concerns the structure of the set of
bias. In the one-player case (optimal control problems),
characterizations have been given, both in the deterministic
framework [9] and the stochastic one [2]. The two-player
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case appears less accessible and understanding the situations
in which the bias is unique (up to an additive constant)
is already interesting. In a previous work [10], we have
shown the uniqueness of the bias for a generic perturbation
of the payments in the case of ergodic games with perfect
information and finite action spaces.
In the present work, we apply the theory of accretive
operators to the study of zero-sum games. We first establish
a preliminary result on the surjectivity of accretive maps in
finite dimension. Then, we deduce some results concerning
the fixed points of nonexpansive maps: we give a condition
equivalent to the existence of a fixed point for all additive
perturbations of such a given map, and we establish, under
this condition, the uniqueness of the fixed point for a generic
perturbation. Finally, we apply these results to stochastic
games with finite state space. We show in particular that the
sufficient ergodicity condition introduced in [11], involving
hypergraphs, is in fact necessary, and we solve a problem
raised in [6].
II. PRELIMINARIES ON ACCRETIVE MAPS
A. Definitions
Throughout the paper, (X , ‖ · ‖) is a finite-dimensional
real vector space equipped with a given norm. We denote
by A : X ⇒ X a set-valued map A from X to itself, i.e.,
a map from X to the powerset of X . The domain of A
is defined by dom(A) := {x ∈ X | A(x) 6= ∅}, and its
range by rg(A) :=
⋃
x∈X A(x). The inverse of A, denoted
by A−1, is the set-valued map from X to X sending y ∈ X
to {x ∈ X | y ∈ A(x)}, so that x ∈ A−1(y) if, and only if,
y ∈ A(x). For background on set-valued maps we refer the
reader to the monograph of Aubin and Frankowska [12].
We denote by X ∗ the dual space of X , by ‖ · ‖∗ its dual
norm, and by 〈·, ·〉 the duality product. The (normalized)
duality mapping on X is the set-valued map J : X ⇒ X ∗
defined by
J(x) := {x∗ ∈ X ∗ | ‖x∗‖∗ = ‖x‖, 〈x, x∗〉 = ‖x∗‖∗ ‖x‖} .
Note that dom(J) = X by the Hahn-Banach theorem, and
that J(x) is a compact convex subset of X ∗ for every x ∈ X .
A set-valued map A : X ⇒ X is accretive if, for every
x, y ∈ X , every u ∈ A(x) and every v ∈ A(y), there exists
an element x∗ ∈ J(x − y) such that 〈u − v, x∗〉 > 0.
Furthermore, denoting by Id the identity map on X , if
rg(Id + λA) = X for some (hence all) λ > 0, then A
is m-accretive. Finally, A is coaccretive if its inverse A−1
is accretive.
Accretive maps have been widely studied as infinitesimal
generators of nonexpansive semigroups associated to evolu-
tion equations in Banach spaces, see [13], [14], [15], [16].
They also naturally appear when considering trajectories
defined by nonexpansive maps, see [17] and the references
therein. Indeed, if a map T : X → X is nonexpansive (with
respect to the norm of X ), meaning that ‖T (x)− T (y)‖ 6
‖x− y‖ for all x, y ∈ X , then the operator A := Id − T is
m-accretive.
B. Surjectivity Conditions
The main result of this section is a necessary surjectivity
condition for accretive maps in finite-dimensional spaces.
Theorem 1: Let A : X ⇒ X be an accretive map on a
finite-dimensional vector space X . If rg(A) = X , then the
subset Sα := {x ∈ X | infu∈A(x) ‖u‖ 6 α} is bounded for
every scalar α > 0. Moreover, if A is m-accretive, then the
converse also holds true.
The second part of Theorem 1 is a special case of a
corollary of Th. 3 in [18]. As for the first part, it is deduced
from the subsequent proposition. The latter is a transposition
to coaccretive maps, at least in finite dimension, of the known
fact that an accretive map A in a reflexive Banach space is
locally bounded at any point x in the interior of its domain,
meaning that there exists a neighborhood V of x such that
A(V) is bounded, see [19].
Proposition 2: Let A : X ⇒ X be a coaccretive map and
let x be a point in the interior of dom(A). Then A is locally
bounded at x.
Example 3 (discrete p-Laplacian): Let G = (V,E) be
a finite connected undirected graph. Every edge {i, j} is
equipped with a weight Cij > 0. For p > 1, the discrete
p-Laplacian is the map Lp : RV → RV , whose coordinate
i ∈ V is defined by
(Lp(v))i =
∑
j:{i,j}∈E
Cij(vi − vj)|Cij(vi − vj)|
p−2 .
Let B ⊂ V be a nonempty subset different from V , and
let w ∈ RB . We are interested in the following boundary
value problem: given g ∈ RV \B , find v ∈ RV such that{
(Lp(v))i = −gi , ∀i ∈ V \B ,
vi = wi , ∀i ∈ B .
(2)
Note that this problem is equivalent to the minimization of
the energy function∑
{i,j}∈E
1
pCij
|Cij(vi − vj)|
p +
∑
i∈V \B
givi ,
subject to vi = wi for all i ∈ B. In particular, when p = 2,
it recovers the classical problem of computing the electrical
potential v on the graph G, with a prescribed potential wi at
node i ∈ B and a prescribed current gi at node i ∈ V \ B,
Cij being the conductance of the edge {i, j}.
Let us reformulate Problem (2) as follows. Let X = RV \B
and, for x ∈ X and w ∈ RB , let x|w be the vector in RV
given by (x|w)i = xi for i ∈ V \ B and (x|w)i = wi for
i ∈ B. Let us now introduce the operator A : X → X whose
coordinate i ∈ V \ B is defined by (A(x))i = (Lp(x|w))i.
Thus, Problem (2) is equivalent to finding a solution x ∈ X
to the equation A(x) = −g.
It can be shown that A is m-accretive (it is the gradient
of a convex continuous function). Hence, according to The-
orem 1, the latter equation has a solution for every g ∈ X
if, and only if, the subsets Sα = {x ∈ X | ‖A(x)‖ 6 α} are
bounded for all α > 0 (‖ · ‖ being any norm). We leave it to
the reader to check that this condition holds.
III. FIXED POINT PROBLEMS FOR
NONEXPANSIVE MAPS
A. Existence Stability of Fixed Points
As a direct application of Theorem 1, we get a necessary
and sufficient condition for the stability, under additive per-
turbations, of the existence of fixed points of a nonexpansive
operator.
Corollary 4: Let (X , ‖ · ‖) be a finite-dimensional real
vector space and let T : X → X be a nonexpansive operator.
For every vector g ∈ X , the operator g + T has at least one
fixed point if, and only if, for every scalar α > 0, the set
Sα := {x ∈ X | ‖x− T (x)‖ 6 α} is bounded.
Note that the “if” part is also readily obtained as a
corollary of Th. 4.1 in [5].
B. Generic Uniqueness of the Fixed Point
We now fix a nonexpansive operator T : X → X and
assume that the condition in Corollary 4 is satisfied. Then,
we define the set-valued map FP : X ⇒ X by FP(g) :=
{x ∈ X | x − T (x) = g}, i.e., the map that associates
to a vector g ∈ X the set of fixed points of the operator
g + T . Note that, by hypothesis, we have dom(FP) = X
and FP−1 = Id− T .
We first deduce from the condition in Corollary 4 some
properties on FP.
Lemma 5: The set-valued map FP has compact values
and is upper semicontinuous.
Then, by exploiting the accretivity of the operator Id−T
we get a characterization of the vectors g for which g + T
has a unique fixed point.
Theorem 6: The set-valued map FP is continuous at point
g ∈ X if, and only if, FP(g) is a singleton.
The properties mentioned in Theorem 6 are in fact generic,
meaning that the set of elements of X for which FP is single-
valued is a residual. Recall that a residual of X is a countable
intersection of dense open subsets of X . According to Baire’s
Theorem, a residual of the finite-dimensional vector space
X is dense. This generic property is stated in the following
result.
Theorem 7 (see [12, Th. 1.4.13]): Let X and Y be two
finite-dimensional vector spaces, and let A : X ⇒ Y be an
upper semicontinuous set-valued map. Then, A is continuous
on a residual of X .
IV. APPLICATION TO GAMES WITH ERGODIC
PAYOFF
A. Stochastic Games with Mean Payoff
An important application where nonexpansive operators
appears, which is our main motivation, is two-player zero-
sum repeated games. We consider here the case of stochastic
games with a finite state space, say [n] := {1, . . . , n}. When
the current state is i ∈ [n], the (mixed) action spaces of the
Players MIN and MAX are denoted by Ai and Bi, respectively,
and if actions a ∈ Ai and b ∈ Bi are selected by the
players, the transition payment is denoted by rabi ∈ R and
the transition probability by P abi := (P abij )j∈[n] ∈ Rn.
The game is played in stages, starting from a given initial
state i0, as follows: at step ℓ, if the current state is iℓ, the
players choose actions aℓ ∈ Aiℓ and bℓ ∈ Biℓ . Then, Player
MIN pays raℓbℓiℓ to Player MAX and the next state is chosen
according to the probability law P aℓbℓiℓ .
We consider here games played in finite horizon. The
payoff of a play in the k-stage game (played in horizon
k) is given by the sum of the transition payments of the k
first stages, namely Σ06ℓ6k−1raℓbℓiℓ . Player MAX intends to
maximize this quantity while Player MIN intends to minimize
it. This gives rise to the value (if it exists) of the k-stage
game, which we denote by vki when the initial state is i.
The value vector vk = (vki )i∈[n] ∈ Rn, which we assume
to exist, satisfies the following recursive formula:
vk = T (vk−1) , v0 = 0 , (3)
where T : Rn → Rn is the Shapley operator, whose ith
coordinate is given by
Ti(x) = inf
a∈Ai
sup
b∈Bi
(
rabi +
∑
j∈[n]
P abij xj
)
. (4)
Here, inf and sup commutes. The asymptotic behavior of
the average payoff vector per time unit, vk/k, as the number
of stages k grows to infinity is a major topic in game
theory, see [20]. When the limit exist, we call it the mean-
payoff vector. Because of the recursive structure of the game
expressed in (3), this problem amounts to study the orbit
{T k(0) | k ∈ N} of the Shapley operator. In particular, note
that if the nonlinear spectral problem (1) has a solution, then
the sequence (vki /k) converges to λ for any state i ∈ [n].
This fact relies on the following two properties satisfied by
any Shapley operator T :
• monotonicity: x 6 y =⇒ T (x) 6 T (y), x, y ∈ Rn;
• additive homogeneity: T (x+λe) = T (x)+λe, x ∈ Rn,
λ ∈ R.
This implies in particular that T is sup-norm nonexpansive.
Let us mention that any operator on Rn that is monotone
and additively homogeneous can be written as a Shapley
operator (4), see [21], [22]. This motivates the following
definition.
Definition 8: We call Shapley operator (on Rn) any oper-
ator from Rn to itself that is both monotone and additively
homogeneous.
B. Ergodicity Conditions for Zero-Sum Games
Let us introduce the Hilbert’s seminorm on Rn, defined
by
‖x‖H = max
16i6n
xi − min
16i6n
xi .
Let TPn be the “additive projective space” of Rn, defined
as the set of equivalence classes of Rn where two vectors
x, y ∈ Rn are equivalent if there exists a scalar α ∈ R such
that x − y = αe. Note that, in this case, we have ‖x‖H =
‖y‖H. Hence, the space (TPn, ‖ ·‖H) is a normed space with
finite dimension.
It is a standard result (see for instance [6]) that any Shapley
operator T : Rn → Rn is nonexpansive with respect to
the Hilbert’s seminorm. Moreover, since T is monotone and
additively homogeneous, it can be quotiented into a map [T ] :
TP
n → TPn. Thus, this quotiented map is nonexpansive
with respect to the norm ‖ · ‖H.
Observe now that a vector u ∈ Rn is a bias of T , meaning
that there exists a scalar λ ∈ R such that the pair (λ, u) solves
the ergodic equation (1), if, and only if, its equivalence class
[u] ∈ TPn is a fixed point of [T ].
Let T be a Shapley operator on Rn. Given two scalars
α, β ∈ R, we define the slice space Sβα as the subset of
R
n {x ∈ Rn | αe + x 6 T (x) 6 βe + x}. As a special
case of Th. 4.1 in [5] applied to the quotiented map [T ],
we deduce that if all the slice spaces are bounded in the
Hilbert’s seminorm, then the game associated to the Shapley
operator T is ergodic, meaning that for every vector g ∈ Rn,
there is a scalar λ ∈ R and a vector u ∈ Rn such that
g+T (u) = λe+u. Observe that, if T is written as in (4), then
g + T is the Shapley operator of a game almost identical to
the one associated with T , except that the transition payments
are given by gi + rabi , i.e., are perturbed by quantities that
only depend on the state.
The above remarks and a direct application of Corollary 4
to the quotiented map [T ] leads to necessary and sufficient
ergodicity conditions for zero-sum repeated games.
Theorem 9: Let T : Rn → Rn be a Shapley operator. The
following are equivalent:
i) for every vector g ∈ Rn, there is a pair (λ, u) ∈ R×Rn
such that g + T (u) = λe+ u;
ii) the subset Sα = {x ∈ Rn | ‖x − T (x)‖H 6 α} is
bounded in the Hilbert’s seminorm for all α ∈ R;
iii) the slice space Sβα = {x ∈ Rn | αe + x 6 T (x) 6
βe + x} is bounded in the Hilbert’s seminorm for all
α, β ∈ R.
Example 10: Consider the Shapley operator T : R3 → R3
given by
T (x) =


sup
0<p61 ( log p+ p(x1 ∧ x3) + (1− p)x2 )
inf0<p61 ( − log p+ p(x2 ∨ x3) + (1− p)x1 )
x3

 (5)
where ∧ and ∨ stand for min and max, respectively. It
corresponds to a game with three states. Player MAX controls
state 1, Player MIN controls state 2 and state 3 is an absorbing
state. In state 1, Player MAX chooses an action p ∈ (0, 1] and
receives log p from Player MIN. Then, with probability p,
Player MIN selects the next state between 1 and 3, and with
probability 1−p the next state is 2. Hence, in state 1, Player
MAX is losing and she can only increase the probability to
leave the state to a more profitable one (namely, state 2) at
the expense of a blowing cost. A dual trade-off applies to
Player MIN in state 2.
Using the hypergraph conditions in [11] for instance, we
can show that all the slice spaces are bounded in the Hilbert’s
seminorm. Thus, according to Theorem 9, the value of the
game does not depend on the initial state for any additional
payment gi granted in state i.
C. Generic Uniqueness of the Bias of Zero-Sum Games
We now fix a Shapley operator T : Rn → Rn and
we assume that the associated game is ergodic. A direct
application of Lemma 5, Theorem 6 and Theorem 7 to the
quotiented map [T ] leads to the following.
Theorem 11: The set of perturbation vectors g ∈ Rn for
which g + T has a unique bias (up to an additive constant)
is a residual of Rn.
Example 12: Consider the Shapley operator (5) intro-
duced in Example 10. We have already noted that the game
associated to this operator is ergodic, and it is readily seen
that, for a perturbation vector g ∈ R3, the ergodic constant
of g+ T is g3. Thus, for a generic vector g ∈ R3, there is a
unique vector u ∈ R3 (up to an additive constant) such that
g + T (u) = g3e+ u.
Remark 13: Let us mention that when T is polyhedral,
that is, when considering a game with perfect information
and finite action spaces, we have more information on the
geometry of the residual set. More specifically, we have
shown in [10] that the set of perturbation vectors g for which
g+ T has more than one bias is included in the finite union
of subspaces of codimension 1.
As an example, let us consider the following Shapley
operator defined on R3 and already introduced in [10] (recall
that the addition has precedence over min and max, denoted
here by ∧ and ∨, respectively):
T (x) =


1
2
(x1 + x3) ∧ 1 +
1
2
(x1 + x2)
2 + 1
2
(x1 + x3) ∧
(
1 + 1
2
(x1 + x2) ∨ −2 + x3
)
3 + 1
2
(x1 + x3) ∨ 1 + x3

 .
It can be proved that the ergodic equation (1) is solvable
for every perturbation vector g ∈ R3 (see [7] for an
effective method). Figure 1 shows the intersection between
the hyperplane {g ∈ R3 | g3 = 0} and the locus of
perturbation vectors g for which g + T may have more
than one bias. Hence, for each g in the interior of a full-
dimensional polyhedron, g + T has a unique bias (up to an
additive constant).
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